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The United States Navy (USN) surface ships must receive maintenance and 
modernization in order to attain their expected lifetimes and the level of readiness that the 
Navy requires. A program called Enhanced Process Control Procedures (EPCP) aims to 
decrease the number and frequency of critical systems failures occurring during the 
maintenance availability. This research aims to identify the costs and benefits of the 
program, determine other factors that cause critical systems downtime and maintenance 
availability extensions, and provide recommendations to improve the EPCP program. 
The costs of the program are the increased time required to complete the work, 
greater funding requirements, decreased flexibility, and possible impact on the 
technicians. Analysis of EPCPs over an 18-month period between 2012 and 2014 
revealed that the total time to develop, review, and correct the EPCP documentation 
averaged 28 days, with a standard deviation of 26 days. The 75% confidence value for 
the total administrative time required of an EPCP was almost 36 days. The author 
recommends using this time duration when planning a maintenance availability. The 
benefits of the program are a larger degree of accountability, lower probability of human 
error, and greater communication and coordination. 
The review of EPCPs suggest that the efficiency of the EPCP program could be 
improved by increasing the number of reused EPCPs, decreasing the number of EPCP 
errors, involving subject-matter experts in EPCP documentation, and decreasing the 
EPCP administrative temporal impact. Additionally, the author recommends the USN 
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The United States Navy (USN) fleet of surface ships must receive maintenance and 
modernization in order to attain their expected lifetimes and the level of readiness that the 
Navy requires. Maintenance refers to the work done on existing equipment to extend the 
life of the systems and ensure that the systems operate as desired. Modernization is the 
work accomplished to extend the life of the ship and to ensure it is better able to complete 
its missions. 
 During these periods of maintenance and modernization, the goal is for the work 
to be completed on time and within the budget, especially on maintenance availabilities. 
Maintenance availabilities are extended periods of work during which the ship usually 
cannot go underway. A program called Enhanced Process Control Procedures (EPCP) is 
used to help achieve these goals. A significant benefit of the EPCP program is that it aims 
to decrease the number and frequency of critical systems failures occurring during the 
maintenance availability. The EPCP program mandates the use of approved procedures in 
order to conduct work on critical systems. This research evaluated the time impact of the 
EPCP program.   
 The costs of the EPCP program are the increased time required to 
complete the work, greater funding requirements, decreased flexibility, and possible 
impact on the technicians. The benefits are a larger degree of accountability, lower 
probability of human error, and greater communication and coordination. Testing failures 
and parts availability may also contribute to critical systems failures and maintenance 
availability extensions. Upon a testing failure, a solution must be implemented, and the 
test must be re-done. Problems with parts availability can include delays in receiving the 
parts, mistakes in the parts ordering process, and a needed part may be ordered more than 
once. 
 This study looked at the time impact of EPCPs by examining EPCP records used 
in Norfolk Ship Support Activity (NSSA) over an 18-month period between 2012 and 
2014. The time to develop, review, and correct an EPCP were evaluated, as well as the 
 xv 
total time to complete an EPCP. The analysis found no statistically significant trends in 
the total administrative time, or in the development, reviewing and correction phases. The 
average total times to develop, review, and correct the EPCP documentation was 28 days, 
and the standard deviation was 26 days. The 75% confidence value for the total 
administrative time of an EPCP is almost 36 days. The author recommends using this 
time duration when planning a maintenance availability. Using an estimate based on a 
75% confidence level limits the risk of underestimating the duration to 25%. Under 
estimating the total time to obtain an approved EPCP will likely result in schedule delays 
and increased costs.   
Record keeping is important for management to be able to provide adequate 
oversight on a complex system. The accuracy of the efficient record keeping system can 
impact delays in maintenance availabilities. A GAO report in 1991 found that the USN 
record keeping system did not have accurate data. The GAO also observed similar 
deficiencies in 1976 and 1982. The USN did make improvements to its system after 1976 
and 1982, but significant problems remained in 1991. The author was unable to obtain 
data to compare the current USN record system with the system in place in 1991.      
Based on observations of the EPCP process, the author suggests that the EPCP 
program could be more efficient by increasing the number of EPCPs that are reused, 
decreasing the number of EPCP errors, involving subject-matter experts in EPCP 
documentation, and decreasing the EPCP administrative temporal impact. Additionally, 
the author recommends the USN continue to improve the record keeping system to 
minimize delays in maintenance availabilities. 
 xvi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank my father, Albert; my mother, Shirley; and my brother, Ray 
for their support. I would also like to thank Dr. Gary Langford and Dr. Diana Angelis for 
their great efforts and help. Finally, Kevin Peck and LT Christina Carino were 
instrumental in helping me to obtain data for this thesis. 
 xvii 




The United States Navy (USN) fleet of surface ships must receive “maintenance 
and modernization” in order to attain their expected lifetimes and the level of readiness 
that the Navy requires. The United States Navy’s Fleet Modernization Program is the 
“primary vehicle for updating the offensive, defensive, and operating systems installed on 
each of its ships” (United States Government Accountability Office 1991, 1). The 
maintenance and modernization work that is not tasked to the ship’s crew is typically 
accomplished during a process called maintenance availability. A maintenance 
availability “is the time a U.S. Naval ship undergoes repairs and alterations to return it to 
a fully operational status and ensure complete mission readiness” (Lawson 2012c).   
Maintenance refers to the work done on existing equipment to increase the 
likelihood that the system will reach its intended lifespan and to ensure that the systems 
operate as desired. The United States Navy’s Fleet Modernization Program has “three 
goals: to improve ships’ capabilities and material condition, to increase fleet readiness by 
improving standardization of ships, and to improve the safety, reliability, reparability, 
and habitability” (United States Government Accountability Office 1991, 1).   According 
to O’Rourke (2010), modernization’s goal is also to conduct work to allow ships to be 
cost-effective throughout their service lives, which can be 35 or 40 years. The USN is 
conducting modernizations on Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers to reach the 35-
year service life that the USN desires (United States Navy 2013). The difference between 
maintenance and modernization lies in the methods each use. Modernization aims to 
accomplish the goals through replacing existing systems and components with newer or 
upgraded versions. Being cost-effective means that ships cost less to operate, maintain, 
and modernize. Through modernization, “ships may be operated with a smaller crew, 
thereby reducing their annual operations and support (O&S) costs.” An example of the 
Navy’s modernization efforts is that the USN intends to modernize their destroyers 
(DDGs) and cruisers (CGs) by using an open architecture (OA). This modernization 
means that these ships will shift to using “non-propriety computers and software, 
permitting the Aegis system to be updated over the remainder of the ships’ lives more 
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easily and less expensively, using contributions from a variety of firms” (O’Rourke 2010, 
3). Another example improving cost-effectiveness is to improve the ship’s fuel efficiency 
by adding electric-drive propulsion equipment to ensure the mechanical-drive 
components fully interconnect (O’Rourke 2010).        
According to O’Rourke, modernization is also conducted to add or capabilities to 
the ship or improve the ship’s capabilities. One main goal of the USN’s DDG and CG 
modernization program is to improve the ship’s combat capability. This improvement 
will help ensure that the ships will be able to complete their mission throughout their 
intended service lives. One example of this type of modernization is the goal of adding 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability to the 62 Aegis destroyers and 22 cruisers 
(O’Rourke 2010).   
For the USN’s Aegis ships, modernization comprises three categories: hull, 
mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) and combat systems. For each category, the USN 
desires to add more capable systems and components (O’Rourke 2010, 3). For Aegis 
ships, the HM&E modernization is planned to occur first, followed by the combat 
systems modernization two years later. This approach may imply that HM&E equipment 
tends to require maintenance and modernization before combat systems equipment does. 
HM&E may require maintenance and modernization earlier due to use and corrosion 
from being at sea. Splitting the maintenance and modernization work into categories will 
tend to make the maintenance availabilities more manageable. However, the risk of 
needed work being missed due to the work belonging in the wrong category is higher.  
According to Roberts (2009), the USN values the tasks of maintenance and 
modernization with such importance that the Surface Ship Life Cycle Management 
(SSLCM) Activity was created on May 8, 2009. SSLCM is in charge of the Class 
Maintenance Plans for the non-nuclear surface ships. SSLCM is tasked with ensuring that 
the material condition of the surface ships allows the ships to achieve their desired 
expected service life. Rear Admiral James McManamon, deputy commander for surface 
warfare (SEA 21) stated, “to meet this goal [the Navy having 313 ships], we need to 
continue to maintain and efficiently manage our existing ships” (Roberts 2009).   
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The Regional Maintenance Centers (RMCs) help accomplish these maintenance 
and modernization goals. There are three levels of maintenance: organizational, 
intermediate, and depot level. Organizational maintenance refers to the work that is 
conducted frequently and is the least complicated of the three levels. Organizational 
maintenance is conducted on the ship. Intermediate maintenance is conducted in 
specialized material shops. Typically, many ships use the same specialized shop. The 
Intermediate maintenance tends to be more involved than the Organizational 
maintenance. Depot maintenance occurs in the manufacturer’s specialized shops. This 
type of work is generally the most complicated of the three levels of maintenance.   
The RMCs conduct maintenance support that includes intermediate level 
maintenance and oversight of depot-level maintenance, which is executed by the private 
sector (Engineering Duty Officers 2012). RMCs aim to complete the ship maintenance on 
schedule and within budget, while meeting the requirements of the quality requirements 
(Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center 2013). This goal indicates that cost, 
schedule, and performance are important to the RMCs. The RMCs seek to keep on 
schedule since maintenance availability extensions tend to increase costs and delay 
subsequent surface ship maintenance availabilities. This delay would also postpone the 
ship that is in the maintenance availability from executing its following mission. 
The Expanded Process Control Procedures (EPCP) program is used by the RMCs 
to help accomplish their stated goals by decreasing the frequency of critical system 
failures, which tend to increase monetary costs and probability of exceeding the desired 
completion date. The author was not able to obtain evidence that the EPCP program 
achieved the desired objective of reducing critical systems failures. If the EPCP program 
is not achieving the USN’s desired objectives, the program may not be helping the RMCs 
to complete ship maintenance availabilities on time and within budget. The EPCP may 
even be hindering the successful execution of ship maintenance availabilities. If the 
EPCP program achieves the USN’s desired objectives, the program likely contributes 
towards ensuring that each ship maintenance availability is completed on time and under 
budget. This paper identifies the costs and benefits of the EPCP program and examines 
the time impact of the EPCP process. Since a major goal during a maintenance 
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availability is to prevent delays in the completion of the maintenance and modernization 
period, testing failures parts availability and scheduling will also be investigated.   
A. THE EPCP PROGRAM 
The USN has experienced repeated problems and failures on some of the critical 
systems onboard the surface ships (Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center 
2012). A critical system is “a propulsion or mobility system for which improper 
execution of required complex work will cause unacceptable Fleet Readiness impacts 
including mission delay, diminished Operational Availability, and/or excessive repair 
costs” (Naval Sea Systems Command 2013). Critical systems which do not function 
properly have a high probability of preventing a surface ship from going to sea. All 
classes of surface ships have the following critical systems: Main Reduction Gear 
(MRG), MRG Lube Oil System, and the Steering Systems (Naval Sea Systems Command 
2013). Each specific class of surface ship may have additional systems that are classified 
as critical (Naval Sea Systems Command 2013).   
The USN noticed “recurring problems especially on the Main Propulsion Diesel 
Engines (MPDEs) and the MRGs” (Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center 
2012). As a result, the USN experienced excessive costs ships that had a decreased ability 
to go underway and deploy (Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center 2012). The 
USN believes that these recurring problems are caused by insufficient work processes, 
quality management programs, and government oversight (Commander, Navy Regional 
Maintenance Center 2012). The EPCP program is a management process than the USN 
implemented to reduce the frequency of critical system failures during maintenance 
availabilities.        
1. Intent 
The EPCP program attempts to create processes to prevent these recurring 
problems (Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center 2012). EPCPs were created 
to reduce these issues by “improving maintenance practices and gathering objective 
material evidence” (Lawson 2012a). Norfolk Ship Support Activity’s (NSSA) Aircraft 
Carrier/Amphibious Ship division head, Commander Andy Johnson, said, “EPCPs 
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establish the appropriate maintenance practices and sequences for optimal performance 
results” (Lawson 2012a). The EPCP looks to address the accountability record keeping 
problems that may have been present and contributed to the failures and problems 
(Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center 2012).   
EPCPs also decrease risk and provide the surface navy’s leadership and the 
surface maintenance community’s leadership with greater confidence in the maintenance 
work. Commander Andy Johnson said, “The use of EPCPs provide greater assurance of 
successful operation at full-rated capacity after overhaul” (Lawson 2012a). This 
statement indicates that the operational testing occurring after maintenance and 
modernization work is completed may tend to fail more frequently than the USN’s 
leadership requires. An operational testing failure is an unsuccessful attempt to meet the 
requirements of test of a certain system. The test is generally required after major 
maintenance has occurred or the system has been in an inoperative state. A ship’s 
successful operation after overhaul is not guaranteed. The risk of an unsuccessful 
operation appears to be high enough that Commander Johnson would identify the greater 
assurance that EPCPs provide as a benefit of the program. These operational testing 
failures usually lead to increased cost and greater time required to repair. 
2. EPCP Document Generation and Approval Process 
According to the Navy Regional Maintenance Center, the EPCP program helps to 
ensure that completed technical work documents (TWDs) have the instructions and 
information to achieve a successful work certification (Lawson 2012a). Work 
certification is the documentation that proves that the required work has been completed 
according to all requirements. Any required testing results also make up the work 
certification.   
EPCPs “establish the appropriate maintenance practices and sequences for 
optimal performance results” (Lawson 2012a). Rear Admiral Gale, Commander, Navy 
Regional Maintenance Centers (CNRMC) stated, “EPCPs create a series of TWDs that 
provide sufficient detail, including all the necessary objective quality evidence (OQE) 
required, to ensure the completion of the TWD accurately” (Lawson 2012a). The TWDs 
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explain what work must be accomplished and how it should be done. Additionally, 
TWDs are followed in a methodical manner (Lawson 2012a). OQE serves to verify that 
the work is completed according to specification. OQE consists of the completed TWDs 
and test results (Lawson 2012a). The completed TWDs and test results are reviewed to 
ensure they followed all instruction, regulations, and specifications (Lawson 2012a). The 
completed TWDs make up the OQE that certifies that the work and tests have been 
accomplished as required (Lawson 2012a). Rear Admiral Gale believes that “This 
documentation process provides all information needed to certify that work completed 
within a ship’s availability is in compliance with the existing technical requirements and 
greatly enhances the overall quality of the repair” (Lawson 2012a).   
An EPCP explains the “precautions for personnel, equipment, and sanitation and 
the prerequisites and initial conditions that must be completed prior to commencing work 
on the critical system” (Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center 2012). The 
EPCP identifies the “required personnel qualification needed for members of the work 
team to participate in the maintenance action, the methodologies to handle hazardous 
materials,” the required materials, and the applicable technical documents (Naval Sea 
Systems Command 2013). The EPCP also contains the procedure, which identifies the 
required tasks and the order to complete the tasks (Commander, Navy Regional 
Maintenance Center 2012). The procedure contains steps to perform and tests and 
inspections to conduct.  
The prime contractor of each critical system generates the EPCP for that critical 
system. The RMC Engineering and Quality Assurance (QA) departments are tasked with 
approving the contractor’s EPCP. The contractor must have an approved EPCP for a 
critical system prior to conducting scheduled work on that system (Commander, Navy 
Regional Maintenance Center 2012).  
3. Execution of EPCP 
According to the Navy Regional Maintenance Center, the contractor must have a 
copy of the approved EPCP with him while performing the critical system work. The 
contractor must mark on the EPCP after commencing and completing each step. If a 
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scenario arises that work or a test cannot be completed, the contractor must stop work and 
notify his/her supervisor (Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center 2012). If 
changes are required, they must be reviewed to ensure they are following technical 
requirements by the waterfront chief engineer (CHENG) from the RMCs or Supervisor of 
Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) (Lawson 2012a).     
If unscheduled work on a critical system must occur, that work becomes emergent 
(Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center 2012). Emergent work may occur 
without an approved EPCP if the RMC Commanding Officer concurs (Commander, 
Navy Regional Maintenance Center 2012). The EPCP must still be prepared before work 
begins (Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center 2012). However, preparing the 
EPCP shall not cause the work to be delayed (Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance 
Center 2012). If a contractor conducts work without an approved EPCP, that work “must 
be continuously monitored and all actions taken observed and recorded by the contractor 
QA personnel and the contractor work center supervisory personnel” (Commander, Navy 
Regional Maintenance Center 2012). The local RMC “shall perform all appropriate 
inspections necessary to certify the work” and must “monitor the work in progress to 
provide the necessary oversight and certification” (Commander, Navy Regional 
Maintenance Center 2012). When the work is completed, “the actions observed and 
recorded must be incorporated into the EPCP” (Commander, Navy Regional 
Maintenance Center 2012).   
B. CONTROLLED WORK PACKAGES 
In addition to the EPCP program, the USN uses Controlled Work Packages 
(CWPs). An objective comparison between the EPCP and CWP program would be 
interesting, but the author does not have enough data on the CWPs to conduct this 
comparison. CWPs are “a set of detailed instructions for performing a maintenance 
action” (Bischoff 1990). They consist of the “records that provide the Objective Quality 
Evidence (OQE) necessary to certify that the completed maintenance was authorized, 
required tests were completed and work was certified” (Executive Director 2013, V-I-
FWD-B-4). OQE refers to “any statement of fact, either qualitative or quantitative, 
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pertaining to the quality of a product or service based on observations, measurements, or 
tests which can be verified” (PM-Essentials 2014). For surface ships, OQE serves as the 
proof and verification that the completed work meets the USN’s requirements. OQE 
provides confidence that system will work according to specification and will not 
malfunction as a result of the recent work and repairs. In addition to OQE, CWPs consist 
of Formal Work Packages (FWPs) (Executive Director 2013, V-I-FWD-B-4). An FWP 
comprises of the “written instructions for use in production and repair, delineating all the 
essential elements and guidance necessary to produce acceptable and reliable products” 
(Executive Director 2013, V-I-FWD-B-6). Some of the significant components of the 
FWP include “material, responsibilities, precautions, initial conditions, procedures, test 
and inspection, and system restoration” (Executive Director 2013, V-I-2-7). FWPs 
contain the instructions for desired work, and the OQE serves as the certification that the 
work meets the Navy’s needs.   
CWPs are not required for all work requests. A CWP is “required when higher 
authority requires a record of repairs/maintenance for fabrication, repair, installation, 
inspection and testing process for specific systems/components” (Executive Director 
2013, V-I-2-4). There are 28 different scenarios that require CWPs (Executive Director 
2013, V-I-2-2). These scenarios relate either to nuclear propulsion systems, systems 
involving dangerous chemicals, such as Freon and flammable liquids, critical systems, 
and tasks, such as electric motor rewind and welding or brazing (Executive Director 
2013, V-I-2-1-V-I-2-2).   
The FWP is “prepared by the work center responsible for accomplishing the 
work” (Executive Director 2013, V-I-2-7). CWPs must be approved “prior to the 
performance of the work” (Executive Director 2013, V-I-2-12). During an “Internal 
Screening, the lead planner reviews each work request flagged for QA and other special 
requirements” (Bischoff 1990, 56). The lead planner decides if the flagged work request 
requires a CWP (Bischoff 1990, 56). Also, the “QA Office conducts an independent 
review before a CWP is released to the lead work center” (Bischoff 1990, 58). The 
Quality Assurance Officer (QAO) approves or disapproves the CWP (Executive Director 
2013, V-I-2-12). Once the CWP is “approved and delivered to the lead work center, the 
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work center can start the work” (Bischoff 1990, 58). CWPs contain “lists of reference and 
enclosures, prerequisites, precautions, shop responsibilities, step-by-step instructions, and 
QA signature requirements” (Bischoff 1990, 58). Once the CWP is approved, the work 
may be performed. The CWP must “be at the job site during the performance of the 
work” (Executive Director 2013, V-I-2-12).     
C. COMPARISON OF EPCP AND CWP 
In both the EPCP and CWP, the QA department has a major role in approving the 
work procedures. Another similarity is that, except for rare exceptions, the contractor 
cannot start work before the EPCP or CWP are approved. Both EPCPs and CWPs share 
similar negative aspects. CWPs are “complex and costly” and “the risk of schedule 
overrun is high” (Bischoff 1990, 28). Schedule overruns are likely to occur if a CWP is 
required for work that is identified late (Bischoff 1990, p.31). EPCPs and CWPs are 
complex due to the detailed instructions that are required for the written procedures. They 
are costly since they require contractors to expend man hours in the creation and approval 
of the documents and the execution of the procedures. Schedule overrun is a risk with 
EPCPs and CWPs since their requirements may lead to work starting later. They may 
also cause work to progress at a slower pace.   
The reason for the development of the EPCP program instead of continuing the 
use of the CWP program is not obvious to the author. Looking at some key differences 
between the CWP and the EPCP may reveal some possible reasons. The party that 
generates and approves each document is different. Using the CWP program, the ship’s 
force work center responsible for the system or component generates the CWP. Under the 
EPCP program, the prime contractor generates the EPCP. This seems to indicate that the 
EPCP program is intended to be used when the ship is under the control of the contractor 
during maintenance availabilities, and the CWP program applies to the periods when the 
ship’s crew has control of the ship. This means that the EPCP is conducted during private 
depot level maintenance and the CWP is conducted during intermediate and public depot 
level maintenance.  
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Another key difference is that the CWP program applies to Nuclear Propulsion 
systems, while the EPCP program does not.   Additionally, the EPCP program only 
applies to the ship’s critical systems. The CWP program is also used on critical systems; 
however, it also applies to systems and components that are not considered critical.   
It may be that the EPCP is a more specific type of CWP that includes changes in 
who writes and approves the written procedures. The intended improvement for the 
changes in the EPCP may have been to obtain more reliable accountability from the 
prime contractors and the USN technical authority.      
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The goal of this study is to identify the benefits and costs of the EPCP program 
and evaluate the time impact of the EPCP process. Additionally, the impacts of 
scheduling, testing failures, and parts availability on maintenance availability delays will 
be investigated. 
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II. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE EPCP PROGRAM 
There are benefits and costs that result from the implementation of the EPCP 
program in terms of the successful completion of USN surface ship maintenance 
availabilities. A successful completion of a maintenance availability means that the 
desired work is done within the allocated budget and on time.   
A. BENEFITS 
The EPCP program is believed to “provide a return to the fleet in terms of 
operational availability through to the end of the ship’s service life,” according to 
Commander Johnson (Lawson 2012a). The benefits of the EPCP program include a 
system that is more accountable, a decrease in the probability of technician human error, 
and greater communication and coordination. 
1. Greater Accountability 
The EPCP program increases the level of accountability. By mandating that all 
work on critical systems must be conducted by following procedures that have been 
written and approved by a technical authority, management is better able to monitor and 
evaluate the process. Problems that occur on a critical system can be examined to 
determine which portion(s) of the process contributed to the critical system failure. 
Management can determine if the complications are due to an incorrect EPCP being 
written and approved, a technician improperly following the EPCP, inadequate oversight 
by the contracting company and government representatives, or a combination of these 
causes.   
Without the EPCP program, an investigation would have a more difficult effort of 
determining what the technician working on the critical system was attempting to 
accomplish and what he actually did. The approved EPCP clearly indicates which work 
the technician is tasked to perform. Since the EPCP also includes a detailed list of 
procedures that the technician is required to indicate once performed, an investigation is 
more likely to determine which task caused the fault or failure.   
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2. Lower Probability of Human Error
The EPCP program tends to lower the chance of human error since it forces the 
technician to rely less on her memory and more on following written procedures. 
Commander Johnson referred to the first use of the EPCP program on an overhaul of 
USS Carter Hall’s two MPDEs when he stated, “The use of EPCPs provide greater 
assurance of successful operation of diesel engines at full-rated capacity after overhaul” 
and “At the completion of the production effort, there was high confidence in the material 
condition of both overhauled engines to perform at maximum rated horsepower” 
(Lawson 2012a). Commander Johnson also stated that “execution of work within the 
EPCP process was more methodical than previous methods of overhaul” (Lawson 
2012a). The EPCPs supported “the high confidence in the overhauled engines with both 
engines completing their break in period in five days, nearly 50 percent shorter than the 
average time required, with only minor adjustments needed during the Sea Trials of USS 
Carter Hall” (Lawson 2012a). Commander Johnson also noted, “There is high confidence 
that both of these overhauled engines will be able to meet their service life expectations 
without major issue resulting from the rigid overhaul procedures and quality inherent in 
the EPCP process” (Lawson 2012a).  
 A possible criticism of the EPCP program may be that it does not use the 
technician’s experience since the worker is following written procedures. However, the 
author believes that it is not accurate to argue that mandating following set procedures 
disregards the technician’s experience. The technician’s experience should be present in 
the written procedures of the EPCP. Additionally, the technician’s experience allows the 
correct execution of the EPCP procedures. A technician with suboptimal experience 
with a system will have greater difficulty understanding and adhering to the 
written procedures. A technician without adequate experience would also be less 
likely to recognize issues and problems during the execution of the work.       
Numerous experts in the military are required to conduct tasks according to 
approved checklists. One of the main reasons for this requirement is the 
acknowledgement that humans, even those with significant experience, make mistakes. A 
significant contributor to these mistakes is that humans do not have perfect memories and 
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can forget to perform critical steps. The use of checklists decreases the chance and 
number of occurrences these forgotten steps. 
Using the EPCP also decreases the reliance on a technician’s memory. Instead, 
the technician must follow each written step. This decreases the chance that an important 
step, whose omission may bring down a critical system, will be forgotten. 
3. Greater Communication and Coordination 
The EPCP program facilitates necessary communication between the contractor 
company management, the contractor technician, and the government representatives. It 
accomplishes this through incentives. These three stakeholders would be typically 
incentivized to communicate more often and with greater efficacy. The dialogue among 
the three stakeholders is crucial to accomplish the necessary work on time and in the 
government’s desired manner. By mandating that the EPCP must be written and 
approved prior to the commencement of work, these three stakeholders should recognize 
that this document must be accurate and reflect their desires. If this realization does not 
happen, that stakeholder is likely to be held accountable for failures on that critical 
system.   
When the contractor company management, contractor technicians, and 
government representatives realize these incentives, they will tend to be more eager and 
willing to communicate and coordinate with the other stakeholders to ensure that the 
EPCP document is accurate and achievable.    
B. COSTS 
The costs of the EPCP program include the additional time to complete the 
required work, increased funding required to execute the EPCP program, and a decreased 
amount of flexibility in executing work on critical systems during ship maintenance 
availabilities. 
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1. Increased Time Required to Complete Work 
The EPCP program tends to increase the amount of time to complete maintenance 
on critical systems when compared to a system that does not require approved 
procedures. The increased amount of time is due to the procedures and steps required to 
be completed before work can commence. Commander Johnson stated that EPCPs 
“required the availability duration be extended to allow for the completion and 
certification of the work performed” (Lawson 2012a). The tendency of the EPCP 
program to increase the time required is due to generating, reviewing, and correcting the 
EPCP documentation and also due to executing the work in accordance with the 
approved EPCP TWD. To evaluate these processes, data from Norfolk Ship Support 
Activity was obtained. The data covered EPCP TWDs during fiscal years 2012–2014.  
2. Increased Funding May Be Required  
The EPCP program should require increased funds to execute the necessary 
procedures and steps. A large portion of these costs are due to the extra man hours 
needed to generate and approve the EPCP for all maintenance work to be performed a 
ship’s critical systems. As will be discussed later in the paper, the average administrative 
time for an EPCP in Norfolk Ship Support Activity is 28 days. Assuming that a minimum 
of two hours per day is allocated to this single EPCP, each EPCP averages around 56 
man hours. At an hourly wage of $33.63 for shipyard engineers, each EPCP has an 
estimated average administrative personnel cost of $1883.28. The average number of 
EPCPs per fiscal year at Norfolk Ship Support Activity was 362. Therefore, the 
administrative personnel cost per fiscal year at Norfolk Ship Support Activity is 
estimated to be $681,747 dollars. Additionally, the technician should tend to expend 
more man hours to execute the work according to the approved procedure than if the 
technician conducted the work based on his/her knowledge and experience.   
Another cost that is incurred by the EPCP program is the cost to implement and 
maintain the program. The implementation cost is a sunk cost since it has already 
occurred. The maintenance of the program includes training personnel to use adhere to 
the EPCP program. Personnel must expend time to gather and track metrics relating to 
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the EPCP program. Additionally, the USN leadership must track and update the EPCP 
program to ensure that it is meeting the fleet’s needs. 
3. Decreased Flexibility 
The EPCP program lowers the amount of flexibility afforded to the contractors 
working on the ship’s critical systems. Since the contractor must, in most cases, follow 
the approved EPCP procedures, he/she is less able to rely on his maintenance experience 
to react to the reality of the state of the equipment. However, the EPCP program tends to 
lower the chance of human error since it forces the technician to rely less on her memory 
and more on following written procedures.    
4. May Generate Disincentives for Technicians 
Although many technicians are experts on systems and equipment within their 
domain, they are not likely to know everything about the systems and equipment. 
Technicians may not have encountered and fixed every fault, conducted every type of 
maintenance and modernization, or used the system in every possible way. This reality 
indicates that even though perfect knowledge tends to be unattainable, the technician 
should strive towards that goal. Striving for perfect knowledge helps ensure that the 
technician is most prepared to perform maintenance and modernization in an efficient 
manner. 
The EPCP program may have an unintended consequence of reducing the 
responsibility of the technician. Instead of being the sole source to conduct a specific type 
of work, the technician must follow an approved set of procedures. The technician is 
doing his/her job as long as the procedures are followed. Since the technician no longer 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE TIME IMPACT OF EPCP 
A. TIME TO GENERATE, REVIEW AND CORRECT THE EPCP 
DOCUMENTATION 
Norfolk Ship Support Activity (NSSA) provided data concerning EPCPs for a 
portion of 2012, all of 2013, and a portion of 2014. This data contains the date that the 
development, reviewing and correction phase commenced for each EPCP at NSSA. The 
data also shows the duration of each phase for each EPCP and lists the ship and system to 
which each EPCP belonged. NSSA’s data indicates whether the EPCP was a reuse EPCP, 
if the reuse EPCP was changed, and if there were errors in the EPCP. This data was used 
to calculate the time impact of the EPCP documentation phases.   
a. Time to Develop the EPCP Documentation 
To arrive at an approved EPCP, the TWD must be generated or developed. The 
average time to develop an EPCP when averaged across each day was 23.0 days, with a 
standard deviation of 29.3 days. There were four data points that were more than three 
standard deviations greater than the mean. The reason for such a large deviation from the 
mean is unknown to the author. These four observations were discarded from this 
analysis. The updated average time to develop an EPCP when averaged across each day 
was 21.8 days, with a standard deviation of 25.7 days. The minimum was zero days, and 
the maximum was 104 days. There were 423 observations. The R-squared value was 
0.0511, and indicates that there is not a statistically significant trend over time for this 
data. The development time was averaged per month. The average time to generate an 
EPCP when averaged across each month was 18.0 days, with a standard deviation of 10.5 
days. This data is shown in Table 1 and graphed in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the data 
plotted daily. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the data after discarding the outliers.   
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Table 1.   Table showing the average EPCP developing time. The data shows the time 
required to create the EPCP document per month. The average time is 18.0 
days, with a standard deviation of 10.5 days. 





















Average Time for NSSA to Develop 
an EPCP TWD per Month
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Figure 1.  Shows the time for NSSA to develop an EPCP TWD, averaged monthly.  
 
Figure 2.  Shows the time for NSSA to develop an EPCP TWD, averaged daily.   
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A histogram of the time to develop an EPCP displays the frequency of the 
durations of the time to generate the EPCP TWD. Figure 3 shows this histogram. The 
most frequent durations are below ten days. The minimum duration is zero days, and the 
maximum is 104 days. The author suspects that this phase could be accomplished in zero 
days because the EPCP is being reused. The mean is 26.0 days. 
  
Figure 3.  Histogram of time to develop EPCP. The most frequent durations are below 
ten days. 
b. Time to Review the EPCP Documentation 
Once an EPCP TWD is developed, it must be reviewed. The average time to 
review an EPCP when averaged across each day was 4.4 days with a standard deviation 
of 17.8 days. There were two data points that were more than three standard deviations 
from the mean. These two observations were discarded from this analysis. The updated 
average time to review an EPCP when averaged across each day was 3.3 days, with a 
standard deviation of 4.0 days. The minimum was zero days, and the maximum was 26 
days. There were 413 observations. The R-squared value was 0.0175, and indicates that 
there is not a statistically significant trend over time for this data. 
The review time was averaged per month. The average time to review an EPCP 
when averaged across each month was 3.2 days with a standard deviation of 2.3 days. 
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The average monthly data is shown in Table 2 and graphed in Figure 4. The average daily 
data is graphed in Figure 5. Figures 5 and 6 show the data after discarding the outliers.   
 
Table 2.   This table shows the average EPCP reviewing time per month. The average 
time is 3.2 days, with a standard deviation of 2.3 days. 

























Figure 4.  Shows the time for NSSA to review an EPCP TWD, averaged monthly. 
  
Figure 5.  This figure shows the time for NSSA to Review an EPCP TWD.   
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There is no obvious trend in the average review time from fiscal year 2012 to 
2014 once the outliers are eliminated. A regression on the data confirmed that there is no 
statistically significant trend over time since the R-squared value was 0.0175. It is 
possible that an improvement may be seen in the future as a result of learning curve. 
A histogram of the time to review an EPCP displays the frequency of the 
durations of the review time for the EPCP TWDs. Figure 6 shows this histogram. The 
most frequent durations are between 5 and 9 days. The minimum duration is zero days, 
and the maximum is 26 days. The author suspects that this phase could be accomplished 
in zero days because the EPCP is being reused or the duration lasted less than one day. 
The mean is 5.3 days. 
 
Figure 6.  Histogram of the time to review EPCP. The most frequent durations are 
between 5 and 9 days. 
c. Time to Correct EPCP Documentation 
If errors are discovered during the review of the EPCP TWD, it must be corrected. 
The average time to correct an EPCP was 2.7 days, with a standard deviation of 7.2 days. 
There were five data points that were more than three standard deviations from the mean. 
These five data points were discarded from this analysis. The updated average time to 
correct an EPCP when averaged across each day was 2.2 days, with a standard deviation 
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of 4.8 days. NSSA started to track EPCP corrections starting in fiscal year 2013. The 
minimum was zero days, and the maximum was 24 days. The author suspects that this 
phase could be accomplished in zero days because the EPCP is being reused or the 
duration lasted less than one day. There were 408 observations.   The time to correct 
was averaged per month. The average time to correct an EPCP when averaged across 
each month was 2.2 days with a standard deviation of 2.4 days. The average monthly data 
is shown in Table 3 and graphed in Figure 7. The individual EPCP data over time is 
shown in Figure 8.     
 
 
Table 3.   This table shows the average EPCP correcting time for NSSA per month. 
The average time is 2.2 days, with a standard deviation of 2.4 days. 

























Figure 7.  Shows the time for NSSA to correct an EPCP TWD, averaged monthly.  
 
Figure 8.  This figure shows the time for NSSA to correct an EPCP TWD.   
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The average time for NSSA to correct an EPCP TWD may have increased slightly 
as time passed from fiscal year 2013 to 2014, however, when outliers are removed, no 
trend is obvious. A regression analysis of the data confirmed that there was no 
statistically significant trend over time since the R-squared value was 0.0048. 
A histogram of the time to review an EPCP displays the frequency of the 
durations of the correct time for the EPCP TWDs. Figure 9 shows this histogram. The 
most frequent durations are below five days. The minimum duration is zero days, and the 
maximum is 24 days. The author suspects that this phase could be accomplished in zero 
days because the EPCP is being reused or the duration lasted less than one day. The mean 
is 2.8 days. 
 
Figure 9.  Histogram of the time to correct EPCP. The most frequent durations are below 
five days. 
d. Total Administrative Time for EPCP Documentation 
The total time to develop, review, and correct indicates how long the EPCP 
approval process takes. The average EPCP administrative time required when averaged 
across each day was 27.7 days, with a standard deviation of 26.1 days. The minimum was 
zero days, and the maximum was 107 days. The author suspects that this phase could be 
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accomplished in zero days because the EPCP is being reused or the duration lasted less 
than one day. There were 1075 observations.     
The total administrative time was averaged per month. The average EPCP 
administrative time when averaged across each month was 14.3 days, with a standard 
deviation of 15.0 days. This data is shown in Table 4 and graphed in Figure 10. The total 
administrative time that was averaged daily is shown in Figure 11. 
A histogram of the total administrative EPCP time displays the frequency of the 
durations of the total administrative time for the EPCP TWDs. Figure 12 shows this 
histogram.   
 
Table 4.   This table shows the average monthly total time for NSSA to develop, 
review, and approve an EPCP. The average time is 14.3 days, with a 
standard deviation of 15.0 days. 
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Figure 10.  Shows the administrative EPCP time for NSSA, averaged monthly. 
 
Figure 11.  This figure shows the total time for NSSA to develop, review, and correct an 












Total EPCP Administrative Time, 
Monthly Average 
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When evaluating the total time for each EPCP across fiscal years 2012 to 2014, 
the average total time was 27.7 days, and the standard deviation was 26.1 days. The 
average total time for NSSA to develop, review, and correct an EPCP TWD seemed to 
increase from fiscal year 2012 to 2014. However, once the individual data are plotted in 
Figure 11 and the outliers are removed, no trend is obvious. Regression analysis of the 
data confirmed that there was no statistically significant trend over time since the R-
squared value was 0.0405. 
A histogram of the administrative EPCP time displays the frequency of the 
durations of the administrative time for the EPCP TWDs. Figure 12 shows this 
histogram. The most frequent durations are between 30 and 39 days. The minimum 
duration is zero days, and the maximum is 107 days. The author suspects that this phase 
could be accomplished in zero days because the EPCP is being reused or the duration 
lasted less than one day. The mean is 31.7 days. 
 
Figure 12.  Histogram of the total EPCP administrative time.   
From the histogram in Figure 12, each duration bin was converted to a percentage 
by dividing that bin’s frequency by the total frequency. Figure 13 shows the cumulative 
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distribution for the total administrative EPCP time. The duration that will provide 75% 
confidence is 36 days, meaning that there is a 25% risk that an EPCP will take longer 
than 36 days.   
 
Figure 13.  Frequency Graph of Total Administrative Time 
When evaluating the total time for each EPCP across fiscal years 2012 to 2014, 
the average total time was 27.7 days, with a standard deviation of 26.1 days. This time 
cost is experienced for all work on critical systems. When compared to a scenario that 
does not require approved procedures prior to commence work, this time cost is a 
significant amount of time to add onto each work order for critical systems.  However, 
efficient planning can mitigate this cost since the documentation process can occur 
anytime. If executed early, the EPCPs can be approved before work is scheduled to 
occur. Early EPCP approval would decrease the chance that work on critical systems 
would be delayed due to an unapproved EPCP. The delay would be limited to 
unanticipated work on critical systems.   
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B. EPCP REUSE 
Reusing EPCPs occurs when a previously approved EPCP becomes the starting 
point for another EPCP for a similar or the same system. Reuse should tend to decrease 
the amount administrative time since the previous approval process would have fixed the 
majority of errors. By starting the development phase with a previously approved EPCP, 
it is likely that the administrative will have shorter durations. The data from NSSA shows 
that the EPCP reuse rate was 6.88%.   
Reuse of EPCPs would help to decrease the total time cost to arrive at an 
approved EPCP. Of the EPCPs that were reused, almost 25% (24.32%) of the reused 
EPCPs needed changes. Seventy-five percent of the reused EPCPs did not require 
changes. This indicates a possible time cost saving by reusing EPCPs. Since reused 
EPCPs require little or no work to develop, 75% of reused EPCPs would not require the 
development duration that averages 31.7 days.     
C. TIME TO EXECUTE THE APPROVED EPCP  
Once an EPCP TWD has been approved, work may commence on the critical 
system. When conducting the work, the technician must have the approved EPCP with 
him. The technician must refer to the approved EPCP in order to ensure full compliance 
with the document. This process generally will result in the work taking longer to 
accomplish than if the technician conducted the work by relying on his experience and 
judgment. This may not be true if relying on the technician’s experience and judgment 
results in a critical system failure.    
D. ERROR RATES 
The amount of errors on each EPCP is unknown. The author recommends that the 
error rate of EPCPs be studied to identify root causes and possible improvements. NSSA 
reported errors on 11% of their EPCPs. The error rate may be influenced by the amount 
of EPCP reuse. An increase in EPCP reuse should result in fewer errors made. The EPCP 
that is being copied is one that has been approved and thus, has gone through the process 
of correcting any errors in the document.  
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E. SUMMARY   
The time cost of the EPCP program was investigated by examining the duration 
of the three phases of the administrative part of the EPCP: development, reviewing, and 
correction. Data from NSSA concerning the amount of time each EPCP spent in these 
three phases from part of fiscal year 2012 to part of fiscal year 2014 was analyzed. 
Monthly averages and histograms were calculated for each phase and data over time was 
examined for possible trends.   No statistically significant trends were found.   
Data from the three phases was summed to obtain the total administrated EPCP 
time. The average EPCP administrative time required was calculated to be 27.7 days, 
with a standard deviation of 26.1 days. A frequency graph was created to determine that 
the duration that will provide 75% confidence of on-time completion is 36 days. 
 32 
IV. OTHER FACTORS THAT CAUSE CRITICAL SYSTEM 
DOWNTIME AND MAINTENANCE AVAILABILITY EXTENSIONS 
There are other factors that may contribute to critical system failures and 
maintenance availability extensions. Three of these factors, testing failures, parts 
availability and scheduling are discussed in this chapter.   
A. TESTING FAILURES 
Testing during maintenance availabilities ensures that the systems function 
according to their required specifications after work has been conducted. If the system 
fails its tests during maintenance availabilities, they may cause delays that can affect the 
critical path of work. The critical path of work is the sequence of tasks that drive the 
length of time that the maintenance availability takes. A delay to any portion of the 
critical path will result in the completion day being pushed back by that delay amount. 
Testing failures can occur due to parts failure, inadequate work executed, or testing 
requirements that are unachievable.   
If a test fails, one of two options must occur. The first option requires rework on 
the system in order to conduct a successful test that meets the testing requirements. This 
option usually means delays that are not part of the original availability time frame. If 
these delays affect the critical path of the maintenance availability, a maintenance 
availability extension is likely to occur.   
Testing failures can occur due to parts failure, inadequate work executed, or 
testing requirements that are unachievable. If the testing failure occurred due to a parts 
failure, the most common remedy is to replace the malfunctioning part. If the part is 
carried as a spare or readily available, the delay should be minimal. If the part is more 
difficult to obtain, the delay will likely be significant if it is on the critical path. Without 
the USN and contractor leadership exerting influence to expedite the arrival of the needed 
part, a delay in the completion of the maintenance availability will be likely. Some 
possible reasons the part would be difficult to obtain could be that the manufacturer 
discontinued or changed the part, the manufacturer went out of business, the part must be 
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refurbished by the contractor and returned to the ship, or a small quantity of parts must be 
shared among numerous ships.   
The second option when a test failure occurs is that the USN technical authority 
approves a deviation to the testing requirements. This option is difficult and rare to 
achieve. By approving a deviation from the testing specification, the technical authority is 
accepting a significant amount of risk. If an equipment issue arises that is related to the 
approved deviation, the technical authority will likely be held partially or fully 
responsible. The approval to deviate from the technical requirements is most likely to 
occur if the testing specification is incorrect, unattainable, or unreasonable.   
A failed test can usually be retested at any time. Once the planned solution has 
been implemented, a retest can occur. Exceptions may occur if the test requires specific 
conditions that cannot always be recreated. An example of these conditions is a test 
during Sea Trials that requires the ship to be moving at a certain speed through water. 
B. PARTS AVAILABILITY 
The ability of a ship conducting a maintenance availability to obtain needed parts 
from the logistics system can affect the probability of an on time completion. The GAO 
determined through a questionnaire that the “most common problem that caused K-alts to 
not be installed was a lack of material availability” (United States Government 
Accountability Office 1991, 15). K-alts is short for Title K ship alterations, complex 
modernization projects that occur during maintenance availabilities (United States 
Government Accountability Office 1991, 9). A K-alt is a Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) approved change that either “provides a military characteristic, upgrades existing 
systems or provides additional capability not previously held” (Global Security 2011). K-
alts vary from installing steam piping drains to installing special hull treatment.   
The lack of material availability means “material was not received in time to be 
installed or the material received was defective” (United States Government 
Accountability Office 1991, 15). New parts may need to be ordered during a maintenance 
availability in order to replace broken parts or to conduct modernization. Delays in 
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receiving the parts, mistakes in the parts ordering process, and parts taken by a higher 
priority ship can affect and hinder the progress of the ship’s maintenance availability. 
1. Delay in Receiving Parts
The prime or sub-prime contracting companies are typically responsible for 
ordering the parts needed for the maintenance and modernization processes during a 
maintenance availability.   
Once the prime or sub-prime contractor has ordered the parts, they will be 
delivered to the contractor. The estimated delivery time may be too long. The delivery 
may also exceed the estimate. These scenarios are likely to cause delays. If the delays 
affect a system on the critical path, the completion of the ship’s maintenance availability 
has a high probability of being pushed back.   
2. Mistakes in Parts Ordering Process
During the process to order parts, there are at least three types of errors that can 
also contribute to a ship’s maintenance availability delays: incorrect parts ordered, 
incorrect parts delivered, and parts ordered more than once. 
If the prime or sub-prime contractor orders a part that is not needed or 
incompatible with the system, the wrong part has been ordered. This error causes a large 
amount of time to be lost since the error is usually identified once the part has been 
received. If this scenario arises, the correct part will need to be ordered and the contractor 
must wait for the correct part to arrive. 
Another scenario involves the correct part being ordered, but the wrong part is 
received. This error is difficult to avoid since the cause lies either with the logistics 
system used to order the part or with the company that manufactured or sent the part. If 
the problem is systemic within the logistics system or within the manufacturer, the 
solution could require a short or long period of time to rectify. This would depend on the 
specific case for the part in question. 
Without proper tracking of the parts that are ordered, it is possible and sometimes 
likely for the needed part to be ordered by different entities. The GAO recommended 
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“that the procedures be strengthened to ensure that material was not ordered more than 
once” (United States Government Accountability Office 1991, 11). Ordering too many 
quantities of the needed part does not directly cause delays in a maintenance availability. 
However, it causes an inefficient process that is difficult to manage. If uncontrolled, 
ordering multiple copies of the desired part affects the budget, which indirectly 
contributes to a ship completing the maintenance availability on time.   
3. Part Taken by a Higher Priority Ship
All ships fall under a maintenance priority hierarchy depending on their current 
mission. Typically, this priority refers to a ship’s need to rapidly receive needed 
resources. Ships that are deployed and conducting operations receive the highest priority. 
Ships that are in port and not planning to deploy for relatively long time have a lower 
priority. If a ship that is high priority has an equipment failure, that ship’s priority status 
may cause the USN to take that needed part from a lower priority ship. Ships conducting 
maintenance availabilities have a higher priority than many ships in port since the USN 
wants to avoid delays for these ships. However, it is possible for a ship conducting a 
maintenance availability to be forced to give a part or equipment to a higher priority ship. 
C. SCHEDULING 
According to the Government Accountability Office (United States Government 
Accountability Office 1991), the scheduling of ships’ maintenance availabilities is 
important in minimizing the frequency and magnitude of_ maintenance availability 
extensions and delays. If too many maintenance availabilities are scheduled at any time, 
it is likely that the ship’s crew, contractors, and government representatives will be 
overloaded. If this scenario arises, the probability of mistakes, inadequate work, and 
insufficient management increases. A root cause of these negative outcomes is the lack of 
time to execute the maintenance availability. In 1987, 32 out of 244 ships, or 13 percent, 
had modernization work that was canceled or moved to another year. Of these 32 ships, 
13 ships, or 41 percent, changed their deployment schedule. The reasons that the 
remaining ships experienced a cancellation or were moved to another fiscal year were 
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unknown. These reasons for the moving of modernization work were not known to Navy 
program officials (United States Government Accountability Office 1991).    
Also an additional 53 ships, or 22 percent, were added to the fiscal year 1987 
program after the 1987 fiscal year budget was submitted to the Congress.   The USN 
seeks to avoid late additions to the program. This is because of the extensive planning 
process that is required to prepare for the installation of the K-alts (United States 
Government Accountability Office 1991). 
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V. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
    Record keeping is important for management to be able to provide adequate 
oversight on a complex system. When each maintenance availability is completed, “all 
work within the availability must be documented and certified” (Lawson 2012c). Fleet 
Modernization Program Management Information System (FMPMIS) “reports the 
installation status of each K-alt and is supposed to list each ship, all K-alts applicable to 
the ship, and whether the K-alts have been completed” (United States Government 
Accountability Office 1991, 18). This information system is tasked with efficiently 
managing the USN’s ship maintenance availabilities. However, the GAO determined that 
FMPMIS was not accurate when the system was compared to the responses to the GAO’s 
questionnaire. 
The GAO assessed that “the Navy does not maintain accurate and complete 
records needed to plan modernization work and measure the results of the program, even 
though it has procedures and management information systems designed to capture these 
data” (United States Government Accountability Office 1991, 4). The GAO noted that it 
was “unable to determine the reasons for many changes in the program’s schedule 
because central records were not maintained and there were inadequacies in the Navy’s 
management information system” (United States Government Accountability Office 
1991, 3). The GAO also stated that it was “unable to determine how many modernization 
programs that were included in the fiscal year budget, but were not completed as part of 
that year’s program, were completed as part of other years’ modernization programs” 
(United States Government Accountability Office 1991, 3). The GAO indicated that “the 
Navy does not routinely measure the results of its Fleet Modernization Program or 
maintain accurate and complete information on the status of planned ship modernization 
projects” (United States Government Accountability Office 1991, 3).   
A. GAO FINDINGS 
In 1991, the GAO created “a questionnaire to evaluate the Fleet Maintenance 
Program of 75 selected ships since basic data was not_ available” (United States 
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Government Accountability Office 1991, 4).  268 questionnaires obtained information 
from “27 Navy shipyards and activities” (United States Government Accountability 
Office 1991, 12). The results showed a discrepancy between the answers to the GAO’s 
questionnaire and the data in the Navy’s management information system. The results of 
the questionnaire showed “1,308 projects had been completed, but the Navy’s 
management information system showed only 308 as completed” (United States 
Government Accountability Office 1991, 4). Around “630 of the projects were not listed 
in the Navy’s information system, and there was no record of any modernization work for 
several ships, although the GAO’s questionnaire results indicated that 38 alterations had 
been installed on them” (United States Government Accountability Office 1991, 4).   
It is possible that responses to the GAO’s questionnaire were inaccurate. 
However, it is also conceivable that the discrepancies observed by the GAO indicated a 
tracking and monitoring process that required improvement. The author suggests that the 
latter is more likely to be accurate since the GAO has observed similar deficiencies in the 
past. In 1976 and 1982, “both GAO reports identified problems with deferrals of ship 
alterations and poor planning practices” (United States Government Accountability 
Office 1991, 4). Even though the “Navy made improvements in response to the GAO’s 
recommendations, it was evident that the same problems existed” (United States 
Government Accountability Office 1991, 4). The GAO report suggests that “if the 
management information system provided timely and complete information on these 
problems to Navy management officials, prompt corrective action might have been taken 
to resolve them” (United States Government Accountability Office 1991, 4). 
a. Departure Reports 
All “Navy activities that install K-alts are require to file a departure report within 
60 days after modernization work has been completed on each ship” (United States 
Government Accountability Office 1991, 19). These Departure Reports “provide the only 
verification that K-alts have been installed” (United States Government Accountability 
Office 1991, 19). In fiscal year 1987, “56 of the 75 ships examined in detail for which 
departure reports were required, 27 reports had not been prepared.”  Officials at one 
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“Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair office said they had not prepared 
departure reports for years because of personnel shortages” (United States Government 
Accountability Office 1991). 
b. Escrow Accounts 
The Naval Sea Systems Command’s FMP Management Office “uses the escrow 
account to track the changes to modernization work authorized for each ship” (United 
States Government Accountability Office 1991, 19). The funds for all “K-alts added to or 
deleted from the program are supposed to be recorded in these accounts” (United States 
Government Accountability Office 1991, 19). The GAO discovered “many instances in 
which K-alts had been cancelled but still had funds authorized in the escrow account” 
(United States Government Accountability Office 1991, 19). Out of 24 cases study ships, 
the GAO identified 13 ships which did not have accurate escrow account information 
(United States Government Accountability Office 1991, 19).   
B. NAVY RESPONSE 
In 1991, the GAO noted that the “program’s management information system 
must provide timely information to managers to support planning, programming, 
budgeting, executing, and evaluating the program” (United States Government 
Accountability Office 1991, 4). In 1991, the Navy’s “official automated data base for 
FMP management, intended to provide timely information to support planning, 
programming, budgeting, and executing the program” was FMPMIS (United States 
Government Accountability Office 1991, 18).   
The USN currently has an organization that has the goal of addressing these gaps. 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Regional Maintenance Office (NRMO) 
“serves as a primary point of contact for critique notification to Commander, Navy 
Regional Maintenance Center (CNRMC), and provides independent oversight of surface 
ship maintenance with particular focus on critical systems” (Lawson 2012b). NRMOs 
“began in May 2011, following several negative trends in surface ship maintenance” 
(Lawson 2012b). Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command in 2011 Vice Admiral 
Kevin McCoy “directed third party oversight of non-nuclear surface ship maintenance 
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similar to the role of NAVSEA Shipyard Representative’s Office and Naval Reactors 
Representative’s Office at the public shipyards” (Lawson 2012b). Commander, Navy 
Regional Maintenance Centers (CNRMC), Rear Admiral Gale stated that the “NRMO 
organizations are aimed at supporting our unwavering goal of improving first time 
quality, enhancing safety, reducing total operational costs, and more closely adhering to 
ships’ maintenance schedules” (Lawson 2012b). Admiral Gale said, “The NRMOs 
support the surface ship maintenance community by reviewing maintenance and repair 
work to ensure adherence to quality, technical, and safety standards at the operational, 
intermediate, and depot levels” (Lawson 2012b).   
NRMO’s “are responsible for performing periodic surveillance of in-process 
work; conducting audits of areas of particular focus to the fleet such as procedure and 
work control compliance; attending EPCP ready to start (RTS) events” (Lawson 2012b). 
There are five NRMOs: “Norfolk Ship Support Activity Regional Maintenance Center in 
Norfolk, Virginia; Southeast Regional Maintenance Center in Mayport, Florida; 
Southwest Regional Maintenance Center in San Diego; Northwest Regional Maintenance 
Center in Bremerton, Washington; and Hawaii Regional Maintenance Center in Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii” (Lawson 2012b).   
CNRMC “implements the NRMOs” (Lawson 2012b).     CNRMC’s assistant 
director for technical oversight, Frank Murphy, who served in 2012 as the NRMOs’ 
program manager stated, “the other NRMO offices share lessons learned and collaborate 
several times a week through phone conferences. They regularly confer to discuss the 
most effective ways to evaluate ship maintenance processes; implement quality 
improvement efforts, lower cost, improve safety, and shorten maintenance schedules.”  
All of the NRMOs “work closely with ships’ project teams to continually improve 
surface ship maintenance efforts in the areas of work control, safety and technical rigor 
oversight and management” (Lawson 2012b). Admiral Gale stated, “NAVSEA and 
NRMOs have worked collaboratively to improve the quality and schedules of non-
nuclear surface ship maintenance by the enforcement of standards” (Lawson 2012b).                
According to Admiral Gale, as a result of the NRMOs, there has been “marked 
improvements in root cause analyses and the critique processes, allowing CNRMC to 
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work with the RMCs to provide clarification of policies and standards for foreign 
material exclusion (FME).”  Additionally, Admiral Gale stated, “The NRMO’s efforts 
have also led to the identification of problems with machinery layup and planned 
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VI. EPCP PROCESS RECOMMENDATIONS 
The author recommends that the EPCP program be more efficient by increasing 
the number of EPCPs that are reused, decreasing the number of EPCP errors, involving 
subject-matter experts in EPCP documentation, and decreasing the EPCP administrative 
temporal impact.   
1. EPCP Reuse 
The author recommends that a greater effort be made to increase the number of 
EPCPs that are reused. The reuse of an EPCP means that a previously approved EPCP for 
the same or similar work for a system would be used as a starting point in the developing 
phase. The alternative would be to develop the EPCP document from the beginning. The 
contractors were observed in NSSA to develop 93% of the EPCPs. Due to this tendency 
of contractors being the entity that develops the EPCP, incentives should be used to 
encourage EPCP reuse. A possible incentive could be a savings sharing systems that pays 
the contractor to save money by reusing the EPCP. EPCP reuse was observed in the same 
organization to be almost 7%. This means that of all the EPCPs used for the surface ships 
in this organization, only 7% of the EPCPs were made based on previous EPCPs. Since 
each class of surface ship will tend to have similar critical systems, the author 
recommends the USN set a short term and long term goal for the amount of EPCP reuse. 
2. Decrease EPCP Administrative Temporal Impact 
One process that may be used to decrease the effect of the time to generate the 
EPCPs is to predict the work needed during a maintenance availability through analyzing 
the Preventative Maintenance System (PMS) records of the critical systems. The PMS 
conducted and its results can provide indications of the state of the critical system and 
which work will be required. This knowledge will allow the maintenance team to start the 
EPCP documentation process early and be less likely to encounter delays in work due to 
the EPCP administration process. The development, reviewing and correcting phases of 
work that is determined to be needed would be able to be accomplished well in advance 
of the start of the maintenance availability. This knowledge can also help prevent some 
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scenarios where the occurrence of critical systems equipment failures results in delays in 
the completion of the maintenance availability. 
3. Involve Subject-Matter Experts in EPCP Documentation 
The author also recommends that the technicians be involved in the EPCP 
documentation development phase. The author does not have data indicating the extent in 
which technicians are involved in the EPCP documentation phase. If the technicians are 
adequately involved, this recommendation is met. Since the technicians are the subject-
matter experts and the people who will conduct the work, their input is valuable. The 
technicians may be able to identify errors in the EPCP that will not be discovered until 
much later in the process. These errors may not be detected at all before the work 
commences without the knowledge of the technicians. Using the technicians in the 
documentation development phase should decrease the duration of the development, 
reviewing and correcting phases since more accurate information should result in fewer 
errors and changes needed. 
Through increasing the number of EPCPs that are reused, decreasing the number 
of EPCP errors, involving subject-matter experts in EPCP documentation, and decreasing 
the EPCP administrative temporal impact, the EPCP process will be likely to experience 
greater efficiency and success than the EPCP program without these improvements. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Conclusions 
This study identified the costs and benefits of the EPCP program implemented by 
the Navy. The costs of the EPCP program are the increased time required to complete the 
work, greater funding requirements, decreased flexibility, and possible impact on the 
technicians. The benefits are a larger degree of accountability, lower probability of 
human error, and greater communication and coordination. Testing failures and parts 
availability may also contribute to critical systems failures and maintenance availability 
extensions. 
In particular, the time impact of EPCPs was analyzed using EPCP records over an 
18-month period between 2012 and 2014. The time to develop, review and correct an 
EPCP was evaluated, as well as the total time to complete an EPCP. The analysis found 
no statistically significant trends in the total administrative time, or in the development, 
reviewing and correction phase. 
The average total time for each EPCP across fiscal years 2012 to 2014, was 28 
days, with a standard deviation of 26 days. The 75% confidence value for the total 
administrative time of an EPCP is 36 days. Of the EPCPs that were reused, 75% of these 
EPCPs did not require changes. 
  The author recommends using the 75% confidence value for the total 
administrative time duration when planning a maintenance availability. Under estimating 
the total time to obtain an approved EPCP will likely result in delays and increased costs.    
The author also recommends the USN increase the amount of EPCP reuse. This 
would be beneficial since 75% of reuse EPCPs did not require changes. This fact 
indicates that there would be significant time cost savings during the administrative 
EPCP process. This time cost savings would be applied to multiple work orders 
throughout a maintenance availability and will help to achieve the goal of finishing the 
availability under budget and on schedule. 
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2. Future Research 
The author recommends obtaining and analyzing data concerning the EPCP 
program during years before 2012. This data may not have been tracked or may not be 
available. If the data is possible to obtain, it would either confirm some, many, or all of 
the conclusions of this paper or, equally revealing, it would contradict some, many, or all 
of these conclusions. The author also recommends continuing to gather, track, and 
analyze this data. Analyzing the data allows the USN to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of the EPCP program. The author recommends tracking the cost and number 
of working hours associated with each EPCP. The author also recommends tracking the 
amount of errors discovered in each EPCP. This would assist in evaluating the cost of 
implementing an EPCP program. 
This paper utilized data from Norfolk Ship Support Activity Regional 
Maintenance Center. The author recommends further work is done to evaluate the EPCP 
costs and benefits utilizing EPCP data from all five Regional Maintenance Centers: 
Norfolk Ship Support Activity Regional Maintenance Center, Southeast Regional 
Maintenance Center, Southwest Regional Maintenance Center, Northwest Regional 
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